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I. Introduction
Vaccines can provide an extremely cost-effective technology for dealing with infectious diseases,
saving lives and averting millions of dollars of potential health expenditures.1 But the supply of pediatric
vaccines in the US appears precarious, with a declining number of producers and products. In 1967 there
were 26 licensed manufacturers, but only 12 in 2002. Five firms produce almost all routine childhood
vaccines, with a sole supplier for five of the eight recommended pediatric vaccines.2 When key suppliers
experience manufacturing problems, supply interruptions and vaccine shortages interrupt immunization
schedules, sometimes leading to children not being immunized. For flu vaccine, supply shortages during
the narrow annual window for effective administration have posed risks to vulnerable populations.
Not all is gloom and doom in the vaccine business, however. Historically, entry of firms and
products has been rapid when scientific advance creates new opportunities. Global vaccine sales doubled
during the 1990s, from $2.9b. in 1992 to over $6b. in 2000, 3 although global sales of basic vaccines
dropped 40% over the same period.4 Global vaccine sales increased 16 percent from 2008-2009, reaching
$22.1b.5 This growth reflects new pediatric products, including varicella, rotovirus and childhood
pneumococcal vaccines, in addition to travel and adult vaccines, including a cervical cancer vaccine and
new vaccine combinations. Vaccine manufacturers spend about 16 percent of sales on R&D, a
comparable ratio to the pharmaceutical industry. Some large pharmaceutical companies have recently
entered the vaccine industry through acquisition (for example, Pfizer’s $68b. purchase of Wyeth was
partly for its vaccine business; Novartis acquired Chiron, Abbott purchased Solvay), and several biotech
firms have entered in the US and other countries. Thus precarious supply of existing vaccines co-exists
with healthy entry to produce new vaccines.
The industrial organization literature has proposed general models of entry and exit to an industry
(Caves, 1998). Entry has been modeled to reflect such factors as entry barriers, whether set-up costs are
retrievable or “sunk”, potential entry and exit of competitors, the extent of product substitutability etc.
Theories of withdrawal from markets include some of the same but also some different explanations,
such as intrafirm cannibalization or interfirm competition in multiproduct competition settings (Ruebeck,
2005), declining demand (Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985, 1990), age of the firm, firm size, and industryspecific characteristics, such as the extent of scale economies, the dynamics of the demand and
knowledge conditions. Entry and exit have also been modeled as interrelated phenomena, with authors
finding a high correlation between average entry and exit rates, across time and within industries,
supporting the incorporation of entry as a determinant of exit and vice-versa (Carree and Thurik, 1996;
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Disney et al., 2003; Dunne et al., 1988). The dynamic processes governing an industry’s structure include
learning effects, both by producers (Jovanovic, 1982) and consumers, replacement and displacement
effects (Carree and Thurik, 1996), and the emergence of a dominant design. Studies also examine levels
of market concentration and its consequences for welfare. For example, industries with a low flow of
entry and exit may have limited innovativeness and some form of formal or tacit collusion (Geroski and
Jacquemin, 1985); on the other hand, a continuous change of competitors may be socially inefficient,
particularly in activities with significant investment of capital, time and knowledge.
This paper focuses on exit from (and to a lesser extent entry to) the vaccine industry from 1903 to
2005. We draw on some of the factors considered in the general industrial organization literature but also
factors specific to vaccines. Compared to most industries (but similar to other pharmaceuticals), the
vaccine industry is highly R&D intensive and heavily regulated, in the US by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and by similar authorities in other countries, with high regulatory costs of entry
and continued operations. However, unlike most other pharmaceuticals in the US, vaccines also face
government as a significant customer, at least for the pediatric vaccines that are recommended by the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Previous economic analyses of the vaccine industry
have focused on the role of government procurement in general -- and government price setting in
particular -- in making vaccine markets less attractive than markets for other pharmaceuticals. Liability
risks have also allegedly made vaccines unattractive.
We posit that exogenous advances in basic science create the potential to produce new and/or
improved vaccines against specific diseases such as hepatitis B, rotovirus etc. Following such a
knowledge shock, several firms may engage in R&D to apply this knowledge to produce a vaccine
product. This R&D race may result in several, slightly differentiated products that meet regulatory
requirements for safety and efficacy entering the market at different times. Even if one product has been
approved, other firms may rationally continue with their clinical trials, given the ex ante risks associated
with regulatory approval and market acceptance and the fact that significant research costs may already
be sunk. We document but do not model this entry process.
Our model of vaccine exits posits that, for a given technology, the vaccine production process
is subject to non-increasing costs over a range that may suffice to serve the entire US market. For public
and private purchasers, the cross-price elasticity of demand between substitutable products is high and
purchasing is structured such that firms adopt non-cooperative, Bertrand pricing strategies. If multiple
firms enter the market with close substitutable products and each faces low and non-increasing marginal
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cost up to the scale of the market, non-cooperative pricing implies that prices could potentially fall to
marginal cost. This creates pressures for all but one product to eventually exit. Products that have higher
marginal costs, shocks to fixed costs (such as the need to build new plants) or less desirable safety,
efficacy or convenience attributes for consumers are more likely to exit. Prices for the surviving
product(s) may nevertheless be constrained by contestability from foreign or previous entrants and/or
monopsony power of purchasers, with the relative importance of these factors differing across vaccine
types.
In this model, new product entry to a vaccine type usually occurs in waves, following
technological or market changes. Exits are triggered by quality and potential price competition, including
dynamic entry of superior products, and by regulatory or other shocks that raise costs of incumbent firms
or reduce demand. In this model, government procurement as practiced by the CDC reduces prices
primarily by exacerbating competition by design of the bidding process, not because the government
imposes price regulation. On the other hand, government involvement through vaccine recommendations
and mandates increases quantity demanded, and hence may increase the expected number of
products/firms in a market, cet. par. Given these offsetting effects of government on price and volume,
the net effect of government involvement on number of suppliers or vaccine exit is theoretically
ambiguous and must be determined empirically.
Our empirical analysis tests these hypotheses related to vaccine exit using data on vaccine license
terminations between 1901 and 2003. The results confirm that the hazard of exit increases with number
of competitors and is more likely following the entry of new competitors, whereas sole suppliers are less
likely to exit. We find that over time, the vaccine industry has become much more demanding and exit
propensities increased after the mid 1960s, which may reflect several factors: higher FDA safety, efficacy
and manufacturing quality requirements following the 1962 Amendments to the FDA Act; increased risk
of strict tort liability after the 1966 Second Restatement of Torts; and possibly increasing government
purchase of some vaccines after the mid 1960s. Correlation between these three trends precludes
indentifying their separate effects. However, we do not find support for the common assertion that price
regulation by the CDC or its share of volume purchased has contributed to vaccine exit, plausibly
because these effects are offsetting. This finding, that government purchase on balance has no negative
effect on firms’ willingness to remain in the market, is consistent with the theoretical prediction, that
competitive markets would likely lead to one or very few suppliers in the long run, given the cost
structure of vaccine supply, the relatively small market compared to many pharmaceuticals and limited
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storability of most vaccines. This finding is also consistent with casual evidence that vaccine producers in
fact seek out government recommendation and purchase of their vaccines.6
Section II of the paper describes previous related literature. Section III outlines our model of
vaccine supply and market equilibrium. Section IV describes the data and methods. Section V provides
descriptive evidence on vaccine entry and exits. Section V reports hazard model estimates of exit for
individual vaccine products (licenses) and for vaccine producers. Section VI presents evidence on
vaccine availability in Canada, France, Portugal and the UK, compared to the US, and Section VII
provides a case study of the flu vaccine market in the US that illustrates the importance of high fixed
costs and demand uncertainty.

II. Previous Literature
An extensive previous economic literature describes the institutional structure of vaccine supply
and purchase, the economic case of mandatory vaccination, and appropriate subsidies for vaccine demand
through reimbursement (see DeBrock, 1985; IOM, 2004). A more limited number of papers examine the
effects of CDC procurement on prices and on vaccine shortages (e.g. Salkever and Frank, 1996). Kauf
(1999) uses data from 1997-1992 on private catalog and federal contract prices for 3 vaccines (DTP,
OPV and MMR) and 1988- 1992 for Hib and Hep B to test empirically whether the public discount
percentage is more consistent with models of price discrimination or bargaining power. She concludes
that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, results favor the bargaining power hypothesis. This
conclusion is based primarily on finding a positive association between the public discount percent and
the public share of volume. She does not explicitly consider the role of competition and treats number of
suppliers as exogenous. She finds that the public discount off private catalog price is also positively
related to number of licenses, which she interprets as consistent with the bargaining hypothesis but also
with price discrimination. Both these studies use data that ignores private sector discounts and predates
CDC’s shift away from winner-take-all procurement.
Scherer (2007) takes a more general approach to vaccine shortages. He considers high regulatory
costs, inadequate profitability and mergers as possible causes of vaccine shortages, and argues that
economies of scale and scope limit the number of vaccine producers. Focusing on the influenza vaccine
and assuming that shortages entail foregone vaccination, he provides rough estimates of the costs of
vaccine shortages and concludes that maintaining additional production sources with surge capacity
would be cost-justified. Scherer’s view of vaccine markets as natural monopolies in some ways
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resembles our hypothesis; however, he does not consider the dynamic competition process whereby
multiple firms enter and then most exit, and his empirical analysis focuses on simulating welfare costs of
shortages for influenza, not the determinants of product and firm exit which are the focus of our analysis.

III.

Vaccine Market Characteristics

1. Demand
Although vaccines are highly effective at disease prevention, their success is a winner’s curse for
producers: the longer the treatment efficacy, the smaller is the annual volume demanded. For pediatric
vaccines that have lifetime efficacy, potential annual sales volume is limited by the size of the birth
cohort. Moreover, idiosyncratic government vaccination policies result in different pediatric vaccine
requirements across countries. The potential annual demand is therefore lower for most vaccine
formulations than for many therapeutic drugs, especially drugs to treat chronic diseases. For adult
vaccines and travelers vaccines, efficacy lasts for several years, hence booster doses are necessary to
maintain protection, but usage is generally limited to at-risk subpopulations.
Governments in all industrialized countries require and often subsidize vaccination against
major contagious diseases. The rationale is that the social benefits of vaccination exceed private benefits,
because a person who gets vaccinated reduces the probability that they themselves get the disease and
that they transmit it to others. As more individuals in a group receive vaccination, the risk of contagion
for those who remain unvaccinated declines to negligible levels – so-called herd immunity – which in
turn creates an incentive for each individual to free ride on vaccination of others, unless vaccination is
mandatory. In the US, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is an advisory body
comprised of medical experts who recommend vaccination schedules for specific subpopulations. For
some pediatric vaccines, compliance with these recommendations may be required for school attendance,
which makes the recommendations essentially a mandate. Government recommendations and mandates
presumably increase total volume sold for recommended vaccines, compared to unconstrained voluntary
market demand. But government recommendation or procurement may also concentrate demand on
preferred products and, conversely, reduce demand for competing, non-recommended products.
The effect of government’s role on vaccine prices depends on whether and how the government
actually procures vaccines, and its market share. In the US, the CDC began purchasing vaccines for low
income children in 1966. During the 1980s, CDC’s share increased, varying across years and across
vaccines from around 30-40 percent for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussus (DTP) and polio, to 40-50
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percent and higher for measles, mumps and rubella (MMR). In 1989-1991 a measles epidemic resulted in
thousands of cases of measles and hundreds of deaths. Following an investigation which showed that
over half of children with measles had not been vaccinated, in 1993 Congress established the Vaccines
for Children (VFC) program as an entitlement for children age 18 and below who may not otherwise
have access to vaccines.7 Consequently the public share of childhood vaccines increased to over 50
percent. Procurement strategies have varied over time, as purchasers learned about the effects of their
strategies on long term supply. Prior to 1993, the CDC applied a winner-take-all strategy, awarding all
sales to the lowest bidder. This resulted in low prices and great volume uncertainty for suppliers. Since
1998, the CDC solicits bid prices annually, which suppliers can adjust monthly but only downward. The
CDC posts bid prices of potential suppliers, negotiates broad supply contracts, usually with a near-zero
minimum and a negotiated maximum quantity. State and local recipients of federal funds for vaccines
purchased under the VFC program choose which approved supplier to use. States that participate in the
Universal Purchase program may use their own funds to purchase vaccines for non-VFC-eligible patients
at CDC prices.
In the private sector, vaccines are purchased by individual physicians and by hospitals and other
institutions that often using group purchasing organization to negotiate prices with vaccine suppliers.
These private purchasers are highly price sensitive because they usually face a fixed reimbursement per
vaccine type from third party payers. Since they capture any margin, positive or negative, between the
reimbursement and their acquisition cost for the vaccine, their cross-price demand elasticity between
competing products is likely to be high. In such contexts, suppliers generally compete for market share
by offering discounts below the reimbursement price.
The global vaccine market similarly consists of large concentrated purchasers, each with somewhat
specific requirements. In most industrialized countries, national governments play a dominant role in
defining vaccination schedules, vaccine procurement and price setting. Vaccine purchase for Latin
America is largely managed by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), but each individual
country decides which vaccines to purchase. Procurement and price negotiations are coordinated through
PAHO, using competitive bidding. For developing countries, including purchases financed through
GAVI, UNICEF serves as the procurement agency. For basic pediatric vaccines, UNICEF accounts for
40% of global volume but only 5% of market value. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of
manufacturers offering UNICEF its key DTP, BCG (tuberculosis), TT (tetanus) and measles vaccines
dwindled to 3 or 4 for each vaccine.8 UNICEF has switched from winner-take-all procurement to
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spreading its demand across several suppliers, in order to keep them in the market and protect against
supply interruptions. Most of the supply to UNICEF is now from Indian and other emerging market
suppliers, with only small shares from the large multinational companies that supply the industrialized
countries. This partly reflects differentiation of products, as the industrialized countries, especially the
US, have moved towards newer, more costly combinations of basic vaccines, acellular pertussis, IPV,
and thimerosal-free products, whereas UNICEF purchases older, cheaper formulations.9

2. Supply
Cost Structure

Bringing a new vaccine to market entails high fixed investments in R&D

(research, compound formulation and clinical development) and manufacturing capacity, each component
of which is subject to regulatory requirements for safety and quality assurance. The batch process
required for vaccines also entails semi-fixed costs per batch. A batch may take 6-18 months to produce,
depending on the type of vaccine and production methods. Thus production is characterized by very high
fixed and semi-fixed sunk costs and low marginal cost per unit within each batch up to the capacity limit
defined by the maximum number of batches for the manufacturing plant.10 Changing production
technology to meet changed regulatory standards or expand scale takes years and millions of dollars, and
requires FDA approval for the new plant. Such costs may be worth incurring only if they can be recouped
over several years of sales.
Costs related to regulatory compliance have increased over time to meet rising quality standards.
In addition, several explicit shocks have necessitated major new investments. In particular, the 1972
requirement that all vaccines demonstrate efficacy imposed new costs on pre-1962 vaccines that had been
grandfathered under the 1962 FDA Amendments. The 1999 CDC request that manufacturers remove
thimerosal required product and plant redesign and reapproval of manufacturing processes and facilities.
The removal of thimerosal, which is a preservative, may have exacerbated the short shelf life problem of
vaccines, at least until new technologies could be developed and built into new plants.
Patents and generic entry Patent barriers to entry of competitors are weak for most vaccines,
which often rely on propriety strains of the virus and sometimes process patents. These do not preclude
other firms from using different strains to supply competing products during the life of any patents.
However, because vaccines are biologics, generics have not been able to use the abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA) process which enables generic equivalents of chemical drugs to get approval by
showing bioequivalence to the originator product. Thus follow-on versions of existing vaccines are
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treated as originators and must undertake de novo clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy. They
would not necessarily be viewed by physicians/patients as perfect substitutes due to differences in
vaccine strain.
Dynamic Competition

Although originator vaccines do not face generic competitors, their

economic value is continually open to challenge by new, improved products. For example, acellular
pertussis replaced whole cell pertussis; inactivated polio replaced oral polio; and combination products
have replaced single product forms for most pediatric vaccines.11 Anticipation of improved technologies
undermines incentives to invest in new variants of older technologies or plants, particularly given the
long lead times required by such investments. The tendency for dynamic entry of new, improved
technologies to displace old technologies may be exacerbated by government recommendation of the new
over the older product, and concentrated public and private purchasing.
Liability risks

Tort liability has sometimes been a more severe risk for vaccines than

for most therapeutic drugs, because vaccines treat large numbers of healthy individuals, usually children,
and risks may be correlated.12 Allegations and litigation related to the pertussis vaccine in the 1980s were
followed by the exit of three of the four manufacturers of pertussis vaccine (Offit, 2005). In 1986
Congress established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VCIP) to provide no-fault
compensation to children injured as a result of pediatric vaccines. Influenza vaccine is also covered by
the VCIP, and other vaccines may apply. Vaccine manufacturers may still occasionally face tort claims –
for example, recent claims related to thimerosal argued that this was a preservative, not intrinsic to the
vaccine. Although these claims have generally not succeeded, the legal costs of defending against claims
and the risk that some may eventually succeed may act as a disincentive for vaccine entry. However, this
risk is now probably modest, at least for pediatric vaccines that are covered by the VCIP.

3. Market Equilibrium
High fixed costs of regulation and production are not a barrier to entry if these costs can, with
reasonable certainty, be recouped over large volume and/or high margins. But the interaction of high
fixed costs with relatively low, concentrated and unpredictable demand and perishable supply is likely to
result in a market equilibrium that supports only one or few suppliers in most vaccine markets at any
point in time. If multiple firms initially enter and each faces non-increasing cost per unit, the equilibrium
non-cooperative price is equal to marginal cost assuming Bertrand strategies.13 The intuition is simple:
once regulatory, capacity and batch costs are sunk, with few alternative customers in the current period
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and limited storage potential for future use, any excess of price above marginal cost contributes to
covering the sunk costs, whereas if a firm loses a contract to a competitor, the product is likely to go to
waste. Moreover, because capacity and batch production entail fixed and semi-fixed costs, respectively,
that need to be planned a long time in advance, producers tend to target for high volumes of production
as they cannot adjust later if demand is higher than anticipated. If such pricing is anticipated, all but one
firm will eventually exit and new entry is unlikely, unless the new product has superior quality or lower
cost than the incumbent. The likelihood of a sole supplier equilibrium is greater, the smaller the market
relative to minimum efficient scale of production; the shorter the shelf-life of the product; and the more
uniform are consumer preferences over product quality. Market dominance and survival in vaccines thus
tends to be related to product superiority for the majority of patients, not to first mover advantage in a
class.
Multiple products may coexist if they differ in efficacy or safety for different patient groups – for
example, if some patients cannot tolerate one component of a combination, a variant that excludes that
component may survive, as in the case of DTP and DT.14 Even then, a single firm is likely to dominate in
supplying these differentiated products if it has economies of scope from producing both the combination
and the component products. By contrast, in many on-patent pharmaceutical classes multiple products
coexist because each product works best for some patients; markets are generally larger; customers are
mostly atomistic purchasers, are price-insensitive due to insurance, and are not driven by government
recommendation; and the greater potential for storage enables manufacturers to inventory excess output
for future sale.
With a sole supplier of a mandated childhood vaccine, the government share of the market
becomes a bilateral monopoly: the government has significant monopsony power because the
manufacturer has incurred significant sunk costs and has no other purchasers of comparable size, but the
government also has no alternative suppliers. Given the declining number of producers, it is unsurprising
that the CDC discounts decreased over time, from an average of 75 percent off the supplier’s catalog
price in 1987 to 50 percent in 1997, and that discounts are less on the newest, single manufacturer
vaccines, such as varicella (9%) and pneumococcal conjugate (22%).15
In summary, the role of government purchasing in US vaccine markets has been to define
procurement rules for required vaccines that are eligible for government subsidy. Prior to 1998, this
involved competitive tendering and centralized purchasing. Since 1998, the CDC simply solicits bids
from willing suppliers and purchasing is devolved to the states. The only direct price regulation is a
11

ceiling on price increases, set at the growth in the consumer price index (CPI), for vaccines that had
federal contracts in 1993. This regulation created incentives for suppliers to develop new formulations of
the price-constrained products – such as combinations – which are not subject to the CPI price cap. Of
the 48 vaccine licenses in existence in the US in 2004, 17 were issued after 1993 (see Danzon et al. 2005,
Exhibit 1). Moreover, the fact that supplier exit and supply disruptions have occurred for flu vaccine, for
which the government is a minor purchaser and does not set price, suggests that government purchase is
not a necessary condition of firm exits (see below).
The conventional wisdom, that government purchase and “price controls” are the major
contributors to lack of vaccine profitability, predicts that vaccine exit would be positively related to the
quantity purchased by the government and inversely related to the government price.16 By contrast, our
model predicts that exit is triggered by static and dynamic competition, due to the high fixed costs and
concentrated market demand. This model predicts that vaccine exit is positively related to the number of
competitors and is more likely following entry of competitor vaccines that have some clear technological
superiority, particularly if this superiority is reinforced by government recommendations. Similarly, entry
of combination products is likely to displace the single components or smaller combinations.
In addition to withdrawal of vaccine products, the number of vaccine manufacturers has also been
reduced through exit and mergers, including the acquisition of Connaught Laboratories by the Mérieux
Institute in 1989 and Chiron’s purchase of Sclavo in 1998 and Powderject in 2003. Merger of firms need
not necessarily lead to exit of products; for example, if the merger is motivated by economies of scope
across vaccine types, the range of combination products offered following a merger might increase. But if
being acquired by another vaccine manufacturer is the least costly way of absorbing the excess
production capacity for a product that has become obsolete, then an acquired product would be more
likely to exit. In that case the merger would be a symptom rather than the underlying cause of the exit of
the obsolete product.

IV.

Data and Methods

1. Data
We collected data on the dates of grant and withdrawal of all vaccine licenses authorized by the
FDA for the period 1901 to 2003. For most of our analysis, the unit of observation is a vaccine product
license, which authorizes a specific product and plant to manufacture that product. For vaccines that are
used both alone and in various combinations, each component vaccine and each combination has a
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separate license and counts as a separate observation. For example, diphtheria vaccine exists alone and
has been used in seven combinations, tetanus exists alone and has been used in eight combinations.
During our time period, 241 licenses were granted, of which 179 were withdrawn and 62 survived as of
2003.
We also report analysis of exit of vaccine suppliers at the firm level, using the FDA data on the
firm holding the license. Thirty nine firms held at least one license during our time period; of these, 10
firms were acquired and 12 exited the vaccine business (measured by having no subsequent vaccine
licenses).
We obtained quantities purchased and prices paid by CDC, by vaccine, for all years for which data
were available. Where data were missing for a few years, we imputed missing values by extrapolating
between adjacent values.

2. Methods, Variable Definitions and Hypotheses
Because we have interval censored data, we estimate a hazard model of vaccine exit, using a
complementary log log function with time varying values of co-variates:
Hjt= h{Cj,t-1, Rj,t-1,Zt-1, Xt-1 }

(1)

In equation (1), Hjt is the hazard of exit of product j in period t, conditional on being licensed in
period t-1. Explanatory variables include various measures of competition, C; measures of CDC
purchase and other regulatory influence, R; other product-specific or firm-specific characteristics, Z; and
other factors, X. These variables and related hypotheses are defined below.
Competition

Since many vaccines exist both as single products and in combination with

other products (e.g. diphtheria + tetanus + pertussis (DTaP); measles, mumps, rubella (MMR)), there is
no unique measure of number of competitors for each vaccine. We considered three alternative measures
of number of competitor products: Direct Competitors is the number of variants of a specific vaccine (e.g.
diphtheria alone) produced by competitor firms (excluding the firm in question), and Indirect
Competitors includes all combinations that include the specific vaccine (e.g. all combinations that include
diphtheria); and All Competitors is the sum of Direct and Indirect Competitors. Exit is expected to be
positively related to both direct and indirect competition. Greater effects are predicted for Direct
Competitors (same vaccine) if substitutability is the only issue; however, if patients prefer combination
products over single vaccines (due to the greater convenience, lower time costs and perhaps lower out-ofpocket cost), then Indirect Competitors is expected to have a larger effect on exit hazards than Direct
13

Competitors. We also include an indicator variable, Single, for products that are the sole source of a
particular vaccine. Single products are less likely to exit, assuming that sole suppliers face higher mean
and lower variance of expected revenue than producers that face competitors.
To test for effects of dynamic quality competition, we include the number of New Products of
exactly the same vaccine type between years t and t+1. New product entry is expected to increase the
likelihood of exit of established products, if newer entrants on average have superior attributes compared
to existing products. We also tested measures of entry defined over t-2 to t+2. The measure reported here,
based on entrants in t to t+1, was consistently the most significant, suggesting that exit responds to
anticipated as well as actual entry. This variable includes new vaccines introduced by each vaccine’s
parent firm, so it reflects a firm’s own strategy as well as response to competitors. We also include a
binary variable, Input, that takes the value 1 if a product is also an input for combinations produced by
the same firm in period t.
Government Procurement and Liability Variables

Universal Recommendation is a binary

indicator of whether the vaccine was recommended for universal purchase by the ACIP; it is expected to
be negatively related to the product exit hazard, if ACIP recommendation increases demand for a
vaccine.17
Government procurement is predicted to have a negative effect on price but possibly a positive
effect on volume, with uncertain net effect on exit hazards. To test these hypotheses, we tried three
possible measures of the quantity of CDC purchase: total doses of each vaccine type that were purchased
by CDC in t-1 (CDC Quantity); the expected number of doses purchased by CDC per licensee
(CDCQ/licensee) assuming that the total government purchase were allocated equally among suppliers;
and CDC share of doses (Share CDCq). These proxies for expected volume are expected to be negatively
related to exit hazard, if CDC procurement increases expected demand for a vaccine. The price per dose
paid by CDC for each vaccine type in t-1 (CDCPrice) is expected to be inversely related to the exit
hazard.18 All prices were inflation-adjusted using the CPI price index. A binary variable indicates the
years before 1966, the first year of any CDC procurement (Pre CDC) and another binary variable
indicates if a vaccine type was not purchased by CDC in t-1 (No CDC).19 If the net effect of government
procurement is to increase the likelihood of vaccine exit, the coefficient of No CDC should be negative.
A similar prediction applies tentatively to Pre-CDC; however, since other factors also changed between
the pre-1966 and post-1966 environment, including many more potential competitors in the market, the
interpretation of this variable is ambiguous and it is included mainly as a control.
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A binary variable, Strict Liability (SL) was created to indicate years after 1966, when the Second
Restatement of Torts adopted strict product liability. The coefficient is expected to be positive if this
increased the liability exposure of vaccine manufacturers in ways that could not be costlessly covered by
insurance.20 However, because SL is perfectly collinear with the Pre CDC indicator, both cannot be
included in regression analysis. A binary variable, Vaccine Injury Compensation Program it-1, indicates
that the vaccine was covered by the VICP in year t-1; the coefficient is expected to be negative if, by
reducing expected liability costs, the VICP significantly increased manufacturers’ incentives to remain in
the market. We also include an indicator Thimerosal, which indicates vaccines that contained thimerosal
in years after 1998; it is expected to be positive, if the requirement to remove thimerosal imposed in early
1999 contributed to vaccine exit. OBRA is an indicator for vaccines that were subject to the CPI cap on
price increases; it is expected to be positive if this constraint was binding.
Product and Firm-Specific Factors

Age is the number of years since the product license was

first granted; it is expected to be positive if new products offer superior quality and hence tend to displace
older products. Year of Entry measures the vaccine’s year of launch. Acquired is a binary indicator for
vaccines that have been acquired from the original licensee; the coefficient is expected to be positive if
acquisition is a means to exit the market and transfer production capacity to other uses. Foreign is a
binary indicator for non-US firms. To test whether vaccines are less likely to be withdrawn if the
manufacturer has a large or diversified vaccine portfolio across which to spread firm-specific fixed costs,
we include a Herfindahl index of concentration of each manufacturer’s products over vaccine types.21 If
economies of scope across vaccine types are significant, due to spreading fixed costs of human or
physical capital, risk diversification or potential for product combination, then exit is less likely for
diversified firms. Table 1 lists variable definitions with means and standard deviations.

IV. Descriptive Evidence
There were 241 vaccine product licenses granted between 1901 and 2003, of which 179 were
withdrawn and 62 survived as of 2003. These products were supplied by a total of 45 firms, including
several government and academic suppliers. Of these 45, 18 firms remained as of 2003.
Figure 1 shows the number of entries, exits and total number of licenses by year, for the period
1901-2003. There are few vaccines in the first three decades, with products for polio (1901), smallpox
(1903), rabies (1915) and typhoid (1916). Entry occurs steadily from the mid-1930s onward, with spikes
around 1952, 1963 and 1970 reflecting entry of 13, 11 and 39 new licenses, respectively.
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License exits are rare initially, with only 3 prior to 1970. In 1970, 12 exits occur, of which 11 are
due to the exit of a single manufacturer (Miles Inc.). Another large spurt of exits occurs in 1977 through
1981, possibly related to the mid-70s liability “crisis” which raised the price and reduced availability of
product liability insurance. This large exit flow again reflects multiple products of a few manufacturers,
in particular: Eli Lilly withdrew 14 products; Dow Chemical withdrew 11 products and exited totally in
1978; the Texas Department of Health Resources withdrew 7 products and exited totally in 1979; Pfizer
withdrew 4 oral polio products and exited totally in 1979; and Parke Davis withdrew 16 products and
exited totally in 1981. These products that were withdrawn between 1970 and 1981 represent several
different vaccine types, but many were variants of diphtheria and tetanus, which had become very
crowded markets, and three of the four pertussis producers exited. Partly in response to this exodus of
manufacturers from the vaccine market, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program was established in
1986. Whether for this or other reasons, no more manufacturer exits occurred until 1988, when Eli Lilly
withdrew its last product and exited, followed by Wellcome in 1994 and Parkedale in 2001. The spike of
product exits in 2000-2003 includes 5 by Bioport, 4 by Aventis Pasteur and 14 by Wyeth.
To illustrate the life-cycle of competitive entry, Figure 2 plots the mean number of products of
given vaccine type, by year from the date of first launch of that type. The predicting equation is a simple
regression of number of competitors on an intercept and a quadratic in years since launch, all of which
are significant at the 1% level. Separate estimates are made for Direct Competitors (same product) and
for Indirect Competitors (combinations that include this product).22 Interestingly, entry occurs mainly in
Indirect Competitors. The predicted number of Direct Competitors increases slowly from launch to reach
a maximum of about 4 and then declines slowly. By contrast, the predicted number of Indirect
Competitors increases more sharply and peaks at roughly fourteen.23 Note that within the average pattern
of life-cycle entry shown in Figure 2, the experience varies across different vaccine types. In particular,
some of the mandated pediatric vaccines, especially diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, were in numerous
combinations in the 1970s and then were combined with Hib, Hepatitis B and inactivated polio more
recently. At the other extreme, vaccines such as smallpox, rabies, cholera, lyme disease, have had only
one or two suppliers throughout their life-cycles and have never been combined with other vaccines. We
report the multivariate analysis of product exit based on the full sample; however, results were essentially
the same and significance increased slightly when we excluded those vaccines that had only a single
producer over the entire period.

16

V. Hazard Function Analysis of Vaccine Exit
Table 2 reports hazard ratios from the hazard function analysis of vaccine exit, including measures
of competition, regulation, product and firm characteristics. Table 3 reports alternative specifications to
estimate the effects of CDC purchase, controlling only for product age and year of entry. The coefficients
are hazard ratios, hence values less (greater) than 1 imply reduced (increased) probability of exit.
In Table 2, the first equation includes only basic product characteristics and a control for the preCDC time period which is also the period before formal adoption of strict liability. Unfortunately,
because both the procurement and the legal regime changed in 1966 these two variables are highly
correlated and cannot be included together. Successive specifications then add various measures of
competition, firm characteristics and regulation. The hazard rate of exit increases between 5 and 9
percent for each year the vaccine is on the market. However, this rate also increases around 3 to 6 percent
with year of entry, implying that newer vintage vaccines are at higher risk of exit. These estimates are
robust to the addition of measures of competition, regulation and other characteristics. The pre-CDC
indicator is strongly negative, implying that vaccine exit risk was much lower in the pre-CDC/pre-Strict
liability era. The estimated effect of the pre-CDC indicator declines but remains significantly negative in
specifications that control for measures of competition, and CDC prices and quantities.
Controlling for these basic product and time period characteristics, each additional Direct
Competitor increases the exit hazard rate by roughly 3 percent, and each additional Indirect Competitor
increases exit hazard rate by 2 percent. Controlling for number of competitors in year t, the entry of new
competitors in year t to t+1 increases the exit hazard of established products by 2-3 percent, consistent
with the dynamic competition hypothesis, that new entrants are typically superior products and therefore
tend to accelerate the exit of established products. Vaccines that are monopoly suppliers (Single) have an
exit hazard over 50 percent lower than vaccines that have competitors. This supports the hypothesis that
competition contributes to low prices and hence that sole supplier products are more able to achieve
prices necessary to cover long run costs. Vaccines that are inputs to combinations have a 70 percent
lower exit hazard than other vaccines, as expected if these core input vaccines tend to complement rather
than substitute for the combination vaccines to which they contribute.
The effects of policy variables are mixed. Vaccines that are recommended for Universal Purchase
have a 60 percent lower exit rate. Controlling for Universal Purchase, we find no significant effect of
whether or not the CDC is a purchaser of the vaccine, the volume of units purchased by the CDC or the
CDC price. Similarly, we find no significant effect of eligibility for the Vaccine Injury Compensation
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Program or the indicator that a vaccine was subject to the OBRA price control. Following the adverse
publicity over thimerosal in 1998 and requirement to eliminate it in early 1999, products that contained
thimerosal have an exit hazard that is 44 percent higher. Although this coefficient is not significant at
conventional levels, this may reflect the very small number of products involved.
Vaccines that have been acquired are less likely to exit than vaccines that are still owned by their
originator firm, but this result is not significant. This evidence suggests that merger of firms has not been
a major contributor to exit of vaccine products, although it has reduced the number of vaccine suppliers.
Rather, the evidence here tentatively supports the theory of merger as a market for corporate control, in
which vaccines are acquired in order to enhance their market potential, not as a means to eliminate excess
capacity. The Herfindahl measure of a firm’s vaccine portfolio is not significant. However, vaccines
produced by foreign firms are less likely to exit, exhibiting a hazard rate that is close to 70 percent lower
than US firms. This could suggest that foreign firms face higher regulatory and other costs of entry, such
that foreign firms only launch in the US the subset of their products that have atypically high potential
value and survival potential.
Table 3 reports more detailed attempts to estimate the effects of CDC purchasing. Controlling for a
vaccine’s age and cohort, the indicator for the pre-CDC time period is strongly negative, implying
increased exit risk in the post-CDC time period. Given the highly correlated timing of increased
government purchasing by CDC, increased tort liability risk following the 1966 Second Restatement of
Torts and increased FDA-related costs after the 1962 FDA Amendments, their marginal contributions
cannot be identified and the Pre-CDC variable must be interpreted as reflecting their combined effects.
Controlling for these factors, the coefficient on the indicator for no CDC purchase is positive but not
significant. The measures of CDC quantity are not significant. The CDC price is negative, consistent with
the expectation that a lower price should increase the exit hazard, but the coefficient is not significant at
conventional levels. Our CDC price and quantity variables may be measured with error, which may
create bias towards finding no significant effects. We lack data on private sector prices and hence are
unable to normalize the CDC price by the private sector price. Even if list prices to private purchasers
were available, these would not measure transactions prices which are often significantly discounted.
Overall, these results based on the universe of vaccines for the entire industry lifetime suggest that having
a Universal Purchase recommendation significantly reduces the probability of exit, consistent with the
prediction that universal purchase increases demand for a vaccine. However, the volume and price of
CDC purchase do not appear to have significant effects, possibly because the negative effect of
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government purchase on price is offset by the positive effect on volume, leading to no significant net
effect. The probability of exit was lower before 1966, but whether this reflects absence of CDC
purchasing, lower liability threat or other factors cannot be distinguished given the correlation between
these factors.
We also examined the exit of firms (as opposed to individual products) from the vaccine business.
Explanatory power is lower, implying that there are unmeasured firm-specific factors underling each
firm’s decision to exit the vaccines market, although some common features may underlie these decisions.
Table 4 presents the hazard rates for exit of firms from the vaccine market for any reason. 24 Firm exit
probability increases around 10 percent for each year the firm has been in the market, which is consistent
with the hypothesis that increasing costs of regulatory compliance as technologies become obsolete may
contribute to the probability of exit of firms. At the same time, firms that entered the market later are less
likely to stay in the market and are more likely to be acquired, possibly because these are small firms
formed to develop newer technologies that become desirable to established firms. Although having
recently obtained a new license does not affect the likelihood of firm exit, it decreases the likelihood of a
firm being acquired.

VI. Evidence from Other Industrialized Countries
High fixed costs would be most widely spread if each vaccine were distributed globally. In fact,
the diffusion of vaccines appears to be more limited than for many drugs, even across industrialized
countries. Table 5 lists the licensed producers of each of the major pediatric vaccines and several adult
vaccines in Canada, France, Portugal, the UK, and the US.
These data are broadly consistent with hypotheses outlined here, that vaccine production entails
high country-specific fixed costs and concentrated demand, such that each market supports at most a few
producers. As predicted, each country has few producers of each vaccine. However, for several vaccine
types, the US has fewer producers than these other countries which all have smaller potential volumes
and more dominant government purchase.25 The fact that several firms have products available in these
countries that are not available in the US suggests that entry into the US is not attractive, given the fixed
costs of entry combined with price and volume uncertainty of competing with established products.
The number of licenses per manufacturer and vaccine is also often higher in Canada and Europe
than in the US. This suggests that the cost of compliance with more stringent regulatory requirements
may contribute to fewer licensed products being maintained in the US. Note that in Table 5 the US
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licenses include some that are inactive and some for further manufacturing only, hence this count of
licenses overstates the number of active producers in the US. These data also indicate that, although
national immunization plans are similar across developed countries, the specific vaccines recommended
within each category still vary, for example, in the use of combination vaccines. Country-specific
requirements limit the potential for manufacturing economies of scale and may require the development
of country-specific products.

VII. Flu Vaccine – A Case Study
A brief history of the supply of flu vaccine in the US illustrates how fixed costs, dynamic
competition and preemptive effects of superior products can lead to few suppliers, despite a limited role
for government purchase. Influenza is an extreme case of limited storability. The influenza virus has two
strains: Type A, which has several subtypes, and Type B. Because these types undergo antigenic “drift”,
the influenza vaccine must be reformulated each year to match the circulating strains. Since 1998, the
World Health Organization has issued separate recommendations in February and September for the
Northern and Southern Hemispheres, respectively.26 In the US, the vaccine composition for the upcoming
flu season is determined between February and March. Since the peak flu season is November-March,
manufacturers must supply the vaccine by October to early November.
The injectable vaccine is traditionally cultured on embryonic eggs and then sterilized. Monovalent
concentrates are produced and combined into the multivalent form, with comprehensive quality control at
each step in the process. This time consuming process requires that supply be estimated almost a year in
advance, and quick ramp up of production is impossible. A newer method of culturing the viruses using
mammalian cells is not yet approved in the US.
There has been a significant increase in flu vaccine production above the approximately 20 million
doses distributed annually in the mid-1980’s.27 In 1993, flu vaccine was covered under Medicaid and
Medicare Part B. Prior to 2000, the ACIP recommended vaccination primarily of seniors and other high
risk individuals. In 2000, the ACIP recommendation was extended to people aged 50 to 65 and to infants
aged 6-23 months in 2002. In 2003, pediatric vaccination was approved for use of VFC funds. By 2009,
the number of doses per year had increased to 113 million (Table 6). Actual uptake has increased but
remains unpredictable at less than 50% of the recommended population. In 2001, only 87.7M of the
recommended 152M people were vaccinated.28 In 2003, although recommended recipients increased to
182M, manufacturers distributed only 83M doses.29
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In 1999, there were four manufacturers in the US producing a total of 77.9M doses: Aventis
Pasteur, Wyeth, Parkedale (owned by King Pharmaceuticals), and Powderject (acquired by Chiron, now
part of Novartis). In October 1999, Parkedale was cited by the FDA for violations of manufacturing
standards. Six months later, Parkedale was ordered to halt production and distribution because it
remained out of compliance. On September 27, 2000 the FDA again ordered operations halted, giving the
company 30 days to implement changes. But given the short window for effective vaccination, it was
unlikely that the necessary changes could be completed for that year’s season. Instead, Parkedale
announced its withdrawal from flu vaccine production, writing off some $45M rather than incurring the
costs of upgrading. Wyeth had produced influenza vaccine for the US market for over two decades. In
October of 2000, Wyeth was fined $30M for the violations and an additional $15,000 per day out of
compliance (capped at $5M).30 In November 2002, Wyeth announced that it would exit, which left only 2
manufacturers of injectible influenza vaccine.31
In December 2002, shortly after Wyeth’s exit, Aventis pledged $80 million investment to increase
filling and formulation capacity, in addition to significant capital investments in 2001 to increase its
capacity by 20%.32 In early 2003, Chiron acquired its Liverpool plant from Powderject and began
aggressive expansion to serve the expected growth in US demand. Chiron produced 25.6M doses in 2002,
and 35.6M in 2003. Before being shut down by the UK regulatory authorities just weeks before the 2004
influenza season, Chiron estimated it would produce 46-48M doses for the US. It has been suggested this
rapid expansion at an aging factory contributed to the contamination problems that occurred.33 About $75
million has been spent to upgrade the factory in the last five years. In addition, Chiron committed to
spending another $100 million to replace part of the plant.34
In July 2003, FluMist, an intranasally administered, live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV),
produced by MedImmune was approved. But because of its restricted indications (initially, for use in
healthy people aged 5 – 50) and its relatively high price, FluMist captured only a small share of the
expanding market. More generally, LAIV products are unlikely to alleviate vaccine shortages because
they are restricted to low risk individuals and they rely on the same embryonic egg based process. For
2004-2005, MedImmune planned to make only 2M doses, despite a capacity to make 20M doses.35
This shrinkage of the number of flu vaccine suppliers cannot be blamed on government purchase
and price controls. Less than 20% of flue vaccine is publicly purchased.36 Medicare reimburses for flu
vaccine at 95 percent of Average Wholesale Price (AWP), which is a list price set by pricing guides such
as the Red Book, based on the manufacturers’ list price to wholesalers.37 Although provider
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reimbursement is at 95% of AWP, manufacturer prices are determined by competitive bids for sales to
physicians, hospitals and others who dispense flu vaccine. Thus manufacturer prices for flu vaccines
reflect competition rather than regulation. Given the high fixed costs and low marginal costs and total
absence of storability of flu vaccine, it is not surprising that competition leads to low prices. Faced with
low prices and volatile demand, manufacturers have chosen to exit rather than incur the significant costs
of bringing manufacturing capacity up to the high standards required. Unpredictability resulting from the
production technology and the very short demand window are also critical. Despite the reality of repeated
shortages, millions of doses are wasted each year, because of overall demand uncertainty and mismatch
of supply to meet the narrow demand window (see Table 6).
But the US flu market also illustrates the importance of threat of dynamic competition from
superior products in vaccine investment decisions. While manufacturers are reluctant to invest additional
capacity based on current embryonic egg based methods, several companies are developing mammalian
cell-based vaccines. Mammalian cell-derived vaccines are expected to provide equivalent or better
efficacy, with lower contamination risk, less wastage and shorter production time (see Table 7).38
In 2003, Solvay's Influvac TC (cell culture) product was approved in the Netherlands, and since
then has been approved in over 60 countries. 39 No cell culture influenza vaccine is yet approved in the
US but several are in clinical trials.40 Given the potential superiority of cell-based products, egg-based
products are likely to become obsolete, hence further investment in egg-based capacity is not worthwhile
without government subsidy. In November 2009, Novartis inaugurated the US’s first large scale flu cell
culture vaccine manufacturing facility, which is planned to be running at full scale commercial
production in 2013. 41 At the same time, an FDA advisory panel rejected approval of the US’s first cellbased influenza vaccine developed by Protein Sciences Corporation.42
The global supply of flu vaccines (Table 8) shows a lack of global diffusion similar to other
vaccines in Table 5. There are over 30 manufacturers of flu vaccine worldwide but many operate in a
limited number of countries.43 Solvay (now part of Abbott Laboratories), one of the EU’s largest
suppliers and the leader in the new cell-based methods, does not have a product approved in the US as of
December 2010. Despite potential for growth in the US market and lack of government price controls,
there was little incentive for other companies to enter or expand using the old technology, although entry
was anticipated and is now occurring with newer technologies that will likely eventually render the old
technology obsolete. The 2004-2005 influenza vaccine shortage, together with concern over a potential
pandemic outbreak, including the avian flu in 2005 and the H1N1 swine flu in 2009, led the US
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government to award grants to help companies expand their influenza vaccine capacity and develop faster
and more reliable manufacturing processes than the traditional egg culture vaccines. Furthermore, the
recommendation for the annual influenza vaccination by the CDC’s Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices has been enlarged to cover around 300 million people compared to 200 million in
2004.44 These changes stimulated an increase in the number of producers from three in 2004 to five in
2010.
Nevertheless, and even though the market for seasonal influenza vaccines across the seven major
markets (United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK), has had a strong compound
annual growth rate of 12.6% since 2005, in fact the US market is still dominated by a small number of
firms, with Sanofi-Pasteur, GSK and Novartis (formerly Chiron) producing more than 90% of the
vaccines. 45 Since this demand growth will likely flatten off, further consolidation of this market may be
likely.

Conclusions
This analysis suggests that US vaccine markets are likely to reach equilibrium with only one or at
most a few suppliers of each vaccine type. This reflects the interaction of high fixed costs with
concentrated, price-sensitive demand and dynamic quality competition in which product superiority is
reinforced by government recommendation. In such conditions, there is no incentive to introduce “me-too”
vaccines, which could not plausibly compete with established firms unless they offer some clear quality
or cost advantage. Consequently, new vaccine R&D targets improved technologies for existing vaccines
or new vaccine categories. Entry of superior products in turn leads to exit of the now obsolete inferior
products. Many vaccines that are approved in other industrialized markets have not applied to enter the
US, presumably due in part to high costs of regulatory approval and manufacturing compliance,
combined with limited and risky demand, with both price and volume uncertainty if multiple firms are
competing for the business. The flu vaccine illustrates the contribution to supply problems of high
regulatory hurdles, fixed costs, demand uncertainty and the threat of dynamic competition. Pediatric
vaccines face similar regulatory, cost and dynamic competitive conditions; pricing may be more
controlled, due to the large market share purchased by the CDC, but volume is more predictable,
provided that there are only one or two suppliers in the market.
These economic realities pose difficult policy challenges. Harmonization of country-specific
regulatory requirements might increase the diffusion of products across the industrialized markets,
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particularly between the EU, Canada and the US. However, given the importance of vaccine policy to
public health, national health authorities are unlikely to delegate autonomy on vaccine recommendations
and schedules. Perhaps the best hope comes from scientific advances that may improve the storability of
vaccines or reduce the lead time required for production. Such improvements would mitigate temporary
supply disruptions. Although stockpiles would not protect against withdrawal of a sole supplier, both
theory and our empirical evidence show that a sole supplier is much less likely to exit, unless a superior
product enters the market. But while new technologies are our best hope in the long run, in the short run
new technologies may exacerbate supply shortages, by undermining incentives to invest in older plants
that are destined to become obsolete.
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Table 1 – Variables
Variables

N

Mean

SD

Age

Definition
Number of years since license was
established.

6883

20.74

16.2

Year of entry (YE)

Year the vaccine was licensed.

6883

1950.21

23.51

Strict Liability (SL)

Binary variable equal to one from 1966
onwards, i.e., the year the second
Restatement of Torts adopted strict
liability.

6883

0.43

0.49

Pre CDC

Binary variable equal to one if year t is
before 1966 (first year CDC procured
vaccines); zero otherwise.

6883

0.37

0.48

Input

Binary variable that measures if the
vaccine may be used as an input for a
more complete combination by the firm 6883
that owns it in year t

0.3

0.46

Single

Binary variable equal to one if the
vaccine is the only one of its type in the 6883
market in year t; zero otherwise.

0.12

0.32

Direct competitors
(DC)

Number of competing products of
exactly the same type in year t from all
other producers.

6883

4.85

4.68

Indirect Competitors
(IC)

Number of competing products from
all other producers that provide the
same kind of protection but are not of
exactly the same type in year t.

6883

9.4

14.86

New products (NP)

Number of new licenses of the same
type that were launched between year t
and year t+1.

6883

1.14

4.19

Universal
Recommendation
(UR)

Binary variable equal to one if type of
vaccine was recommended by the
Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices in year t; zero otherwise.

6883

0.13

0.34

Foreign

Binary variable equal to one if the firm
that owns the license in not
headquartered in the USA; zero
otherwise.

6883

0.12

0.32

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for type
of licenses owned by the firm in year t.

6883

0.22

0.25

Acquired

Binary variable equal to one if license

6883

0.14

0.35
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no longer belongs to original
manufacturer; zero otherwise.
Vaccine
Compensation Fund
(VCF)

Binary variable if vaccine is covered
by the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program; zero
otherwise.

6883

0.14

0.34

Obra

Binary variable if vaccine is covered
by the Obra cap; zero otherwise.

6883

0.02

0.13

Thimerosal

Binary variable equal to one if the
vaccine contains thimerosal and it is
after 1998 (the decision to require the
removal of thimerosal from all
vaccines was taken in early 1999); zero
otherwise.

6883

0.02

0.15

No CDC

Binary variable equal to one if type of
vaccine is not procured by CDC in year
t-1; zero otherwise.

6883

0.87

0.34

CDCQ

Number of doses of that type of
vaccine purchased by the CDC in year
t-1 (in 10s of thousands).

6821

44.67

172.01

CDCP

Price paid by the CDC for that type of
vaccine in year t-1.

6821

0.13

0.53

CDCQs

Number of doses of that type of
vaccine purchased by the CDC in year
t-1 divided by the number of licenses
of that type.

6821

13.86

63.6
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Table 2 – Impact of Competition (hazard ratios)
(1)
(2)
(3)
a
a
Age
1.053
1.063
1.067a
(7.21)
(6.60)
(6.28)
a
a
1.041
1.040a
YE
1.031
(4.71)
(5.00)
(4.74)
a
a
SLDV
14.341 11.332
9.790a
(8.48)
(4.97)
(4.63)
a
a
Input
0.399
0.322
0.323a
(-3.39) (-3.48) (-3.31)
Single
0.434a 0.517b
0.539c
(-2.71) (-2.03) (-1.89)
DC
1.055a
1.030b
(3.37)
(2.007)
IC
1.015b
(2.30)
NP

(4)
1.068a
(6.29)
1.041a
(4.81)
9.477a
(4.56)
0.321a
(-3.36)
0.522c
(-1.93)
1.028b
(1.98)
1.013c
(1.95)
1.028a
(3.84)

UR

(5)
1.072a
(6.03)
1.047a
(5.01)
9.483a
(4.41)
0.251a
(-3.91)
0.457b
(-2.43)
1.024
(1.34)
1.022a
(2.83)
1.026a
(4.04)
0.388a
(-3.52)

Foreign
HHI
Acquired

(6)
1.085a
(7.05)
1.063a
(6.09)
7.903a
(3.86)
0.227a
(-3.62)
0.446a
(-2.56)
1.035c
(1.95)
1.020a
(2.78)
1.028a
(4.16)
0.354a
(-3.58)

(7)
1.076a
(7.11)
1.054a
(5.71)
9.565a
(4.12)
0.216a
(-3.53)
0.473b
(-2.34)
1.032c
(1.85)
1.019a
(2.75)
1.028a
(4.08)
0.337a
(-3.42)

(8)
1.089a
(6.88)
1.067a
(5.94)
7.319a
(3.74)
0.223a
(-3.67)
0.472b
(-2.38)
1.036b
(2.09)
1.021a
(2.76)
1.028a
(4.24)
0.343a
(-2.95)

0.308a
(-4.43)
0.768
(-0.52)
0.869
(-0.55)

0.310a
(-4.37)
0.772
(-0.51)
0.839
(-0.68)
1.225
(0.65)

0.302a
(-4.50)
0.803
(-0.44)
0.893
(-0.46)

VCF
Obra

0.947
(-0.13)
1.444
(1.25)

Thimerosal
No CDC

1.053
(0.13)
0.864
(-0.85)
1.001
(0.69)

CDCPrice
CDCQ/license
LogLikelihood
Wald chi2

-716.6

-712.8

-709.0

-707.1

-697.7

-683.5

-682.3

-678.9

115.64

106.69

102.27

118.58

111.98

195.30

371.45

258.03
29

D.o.f.
5
6
7
8
9
12
15
15
241
Licenses
179
Events
Spells
6883
6883
6883
6883
6883
6883
6883
6821
Note: Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. Superscripts a, b and c indicate that the estimated
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3 – Market trend and CDC’s role (hazard ratios)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
a
a
a
Age
1.107
1.103
1.110
1.111a
(14.05) (10.22) (10.81) (10.91)

(5)
1.111a
(10.80)

(6)
1.110a
(10.93)

(7)
1.111a
(10.91)

YE

1.082a
(10.87)

1.079a
(7.94)

1.086a
(8.58)

1.087a
(8.70)

1.087a
(8.63)

1.086a
(8.69)

1.087a
(8.71)

SLDV

4.014a
(8.48)

3.703a
(5.59)

3.813a
(5.99)

3.779a
(6.02)

3.774a
(6.03)

3.773a
(6.05)

3.757a
(6.08)

Pre CDC

0.729
(-0.46)

0.860
(-0.22)

0.869
(-0.21)

0.867
(-0.21)

0.856
(-0.23)

0.864
(-0.22)

No CDC

1.202
(0.88)

1.222
(0.70)

1.058
(0.20)

1.044
(0.12)

1.136
(0.52)

1.025
(0.08)

CDCQ
CDCPrice
CDCQ/license

1.000
(-0.13)

1.000
(-0.12)
0.821
(-1.29)

0.822
(-1.30)

0.842
(-1.19)
0.999
(-0.65)

0.999
(-0.37)

Log-Likelihood -726.02 -725.54 -720.22 -719.68 -719.68 -719.99 -719.61
Wald chi2
251.91 265.27 274.35 271.26 276.66 271.05 271.49
D.o.f.
3
5
6
6
7
6
7
241
Licenses
179
Events
Spells
6883
6883
6821
6821
6821
6821
6821
Note: Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. Superscripts a, b and c indicate that the estimated
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 4 – Exit of firms (hazard ratios)
Events treated jointly
Age
1.099a
(6.17)
YE
1.085a
(5.72)
Single
0.119b
(-2.31)
Foreign
0.368c
(-1.79)
HHI
2.627
(1.09)
Time since last launch
0.966
(-1.15)

Exit
1.074a
(4.70)
1.068a
(4.04)
0.230
(-1.19)
0.311
(-1.46)
10.219
(1.63)
1.006
(0.16)

Acquired
1.152a
(4.26)
1.120a
(3.42)
0.048b
(-2.24)
0.744
(-0.35)
0.789
(-0.18)
0.881a
(-2.90)

Log-Likelihood
-86.44
-52.66
-42.40
Wald chi2
66.57
64.18
30.63
D.o.f.
6
Firms
39
Events
22
12
10
Spells
1269
Note: Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. Superscripts a, b and c indicate that the estimated
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 5 - Valid License Holders and Year of License by Country in 2004
Type
USA
Canada
UK
DTP & HBV &
IPV & Hib
GSK(20021)
DTP & HBV &
IPV
AVT(19971)
AVT(19981,
DTP & IPV &
20021)
Hib
DTP & HBV
DTP & Hib

AVT(19961)
WYE(1993)
AVT(19971)

DTP & IPV

DTP

DT & IPV
DT

D
T

P
MeaMR

AVT(19921, 20021)
BXT(19981)
GSK(19971)
2

AVT(1955 , 1984,
1997)
CHR(1997)
MBL(19702)
SSI(1998)
AVT(1934, 1970)
MBL(1970)
SSI(1998)
RFM(19921)
TKD(19911)
MRK(1971)

AVT(19961,
19991)

AVT(1984, 1995)
AVT(19802)
IDB(1991)

AVT(1995)
GSK(20021)
AVT(19981,
20011)
GSK(20041)
AVT(1993)
CHR(1997)
GSK(19991,
20011)
AVT(2003)
AVT(1993,
19932)
CHR(19982)

France
AVT(20001,6)
GSK(20001)
AVT(1993, 19936,
19981, 19981,6)
GSK(19971)
AVT(1993, 19981)
AVT(19756, 1985,
19981,6, 20021,6)
GSK(19961)
AVT(1997)

AVT(19776, 20006)
AVT(1984, 1996,
19962)

AVT(1980)
IDB(1991)

AVT(1993)
CHR(1998, 2001)

AVT(1973, 19786)
AVT(19754,6)
AVT(19875)

GSK(1998)

AVT(1996)

AVT(1985, 19936,
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Portugal
AVT(20006)
GSK(2000)
AVT(19986)
GSK(2000)
AVT(19986,
20006)
GSK(1999)
GSK(1996, 1997)
AVT(20006)
GSK(2000)
AVT(19986,
20016, 20026)
AVT(19916)
GSK(1996, 1997,
2000)
RVL(1980)
AVT(19996)
AVT(2003)
GSK(19962)
RVL(1980, 19802)
RVL(1969)
AVT(19916)
GSK(1996)

AVT(19996)

MRK(1979)

GSK(1997)

19946)
GSK(1999)

SSB(1996)

AVT(1994)
AVT(1989)
AVT(1996)
AVT(1989, 1992,
1995, 1995)

AVT(1981)
AVT(1986)
AVT(1983, 20016)
AVT(1988)

MeaM
MeaR
Mea
M
R

MRK(1973)

PNC_c
PNC_p

WYE(2000)
MRK(1977)

WYE(2001)
AVT(1997)
MRK(1978)

Polio

AVT(19873, 19903)
WYE(1963)
MRK(1995)

AVT(19873,
19973)
GSK(1999)
MRK(2002)
GSK(1991)
MRK(1987)
GSK(1997)
AVT(1998)
BBT(1999)
GSK(1995)
MRK(1996)

Var
HBV
HAV&HBV
HAV

MRK(1963)
MRK(1967)
MRK(1969)

GSK(1989)
MRK(1986)
GSK(2001)
GSK(1995)
MRK(1996)

AVT(20043)
GSK(1994, 1994)
GSK(2002)
AVT(2003)
AVT(2001)
GSK(2001)
AVT(1996, 1996)
GSK(1994)
ISB(1999)
AVT(2001, 2001)
GSK(1999)

HAV&Typ
Hib&HBV&Men
Hib&HBV
Hib

AVT(2000, 2000)

WYE(2001)
AVT(1996, 20016,
20016)
SLV(1985)
AVT(19823)
AVT(20036)
GSK(2003)
AVT(19876, 20016)
GSK(1994)
GSK(1996)
AVT(1996, 19966,
19976)
GSK(1994)
ISB(2003)
AVT(20036, 2003)

GSK(1998)
RVL(1989)

GSK(1984)
AVT(19856)
WYE(2001)
AVT(19986,
20016)
AVT(20006)
GSK(1984)
AVT(20036)
GSK(2003)
AVT(20016)
GSK(1987)
GSK(1996, 2002)
AVT(19976,
19976)
GSK(1997)
ISB(2000)
AVT(20026)
AVT(19996)

MRK(1996)
AVT(19937)
MRK(1989)
WYE(1988)

AVT(1992)
MRK(1997)

GSK(1996)
AVT(1992)
GSK(1999)
WYE(1992)

34

AVT(1992, 19926)
GSK(1997)

AVT(19966,8,
19996)
GSK(1998)
WYE(1994)

Men ACWY

AVT(1981)

AVT(1983)

Men A&C

AVT(1976)

Men C

AVT(1975)

AVT(1993)
GSK(1992)
CHR(2001)
IDB(2001)
WYE(2003)

Men A
Flu

AVT(1975)
AVT(1947)
CHR(1988)
MIN(2003)

BCG

AVT(1998)
ORG(1987)

AVT(1997)
GSK(1993)
AVT(1994)

AVT(20026)
AVT(1996)

AVT(20006)

WYE(1999)
BXT(2000)
CHR(2000, 2001)

AVT(20026)
BXT(2003)
CHR(2002)
WYE(2002)

AVT(20016)
BXT(2001)
CHR(2001)
WYE(2000)

AVT(1981,1996)
IDB(1991)

AVT(1998, 1999)
CHR(1998, 1999,
2001)
GSK(1998)
ISB(2002)
SLV(1998, 2000,
2004)

AVT(1961, 1990)
IDB(1991, 1994)
ORG(1995)

SSI(2002)

AVT(1998, 1998,
20016)
EVN(1998)
CHR(1998, 1999,
2001)
GSK(1998)
PFM(1991)
SLV(1998, 2000)
AVT(1976, 19786,
1987)
SSI(2004)

AVT(19986,
19986, 20006)
CHR(1999, 2000)
EVN(1996)
ISB(2001)
GSK(1998)
SLV(1998, 2001,
2004)
JMF(2003)
LIB(1992)

1 – Acellular Pertussis
2 – For adults
3 – IPV
4 – Combined with IPV
5 – Combined with Influenza
6 - In 1994, Merck Vaccine Division and Pasteur Mérieux Connaught (now Aventis Pasteur) formed a joint venture to market human
vaccines in Europe and to collaborate in the development of combination vaccines for distribution. The equal shares joint venture is
known as Aventis Pasteur MSD, S.N.C.
7 – Combined with Tetanus Toxoid
8- Combined with Men C
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AVT – Aventis Pasteur
BIK - BIKEN - The Research Foundation for Microbial Diseases, Osaka University
BBT – Berna Biotech Ltd.
BPT – BioPort Corporation
BXT – Baxter Healthcare
CHR – Chiron S.R.L.
EVN – Evans Vaccines
GOV – United Kingdom Department of Health
GSK – GlaxoSmithkline Inc.
IDB - ID Biomedical Corporation
ISB - Istituto Sieroterapico Berna, S.r. l.
JMF - J. M. Farmacêutica, Lda.
LIB – Laboratorios Inibsa, S.A.
MBL - Massachusetts Biologic Laboratories
MIN - MedImmune Vaccines, Inc
MRK - Merck&Co, Inc
ORG – Organon Teknika Corporation
PFM – Pierre Fabre Medicament
RVL - Raúl Vieira, Lda.
SBL – SBL Vaccine AB
SLV – Solvay Pharma
SSB - Swiss Serum and Vaccine Institute Berne
SSI - Staten Serum Institute
TKD - Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.
WYE - Wyeth Lederle Vaccines SA
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Table 6 – Total Doses of Flu Vaccine Produced and Distributed, by Manufacturer:
US 2000-2009

Flu

Total #

Season Doses
Produced
2000-

77.9M

Total #

Supplier

Product

Doses

Doses

% of Total

Produced

US Doses

Distributed
70.4M

2001

Distributed
Aventis

A

Fluzone

35M

45%

Flusheild

24M

31%

Pasteur
Wyeth

Pnu-Immune

2001-

87.7M

77.7M

2002

MedevaB

Fluvirin

20M

26%

Parkedale

Fluogen

0MC

0%

Aventis

Fluzone

50M

57%

Flushield

21M

24%

Pasteur
Wyeth

Pnu-Immune

2002-

95.0M

83.0M

2003

Powderject

Fluvirin

17M

19%

Aventis

Fluzone

43ME

45%

Flushield

21M

22%

Pasteur
Wyeth

Pnu-Immune

2003-

86.9M

83.1M

2004

PowderjectD

Fluvirin

26M

27%

Aventis

Fluzone

43M

49%

Fluvirin

39M

45%

MedImmune/ FluMist

5MF

6%

Fluzone

58MH

95%

Fluvirin

0MI

0%

Pasteur
Chiron

Wyeth
20042005

61MG

57.0 M

Aventis
Pasteur
Chiron
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2005-

88.5M

81.5M

2006

MedImmune

FluMist

3M

5%

Chiron

Fluvirin

15M

17%

GlaxoSmith

Fluarix

7M

8%

MedImmune

FluMist

3M

3%

Sanofi-

Fluzone

63M

71%

GlaxoSmith

Fluarix

41M

34%

KlineK

FluLaval

MedImmune

FluMist

3M

3%

Novartis

Fluvirin

25.6M

21%

Fluzone

51.3M

42%

CSL

Afluria

2M

1%

GlaxoSmith

Fluarix

35M

25%

KlineK

FluLaval

MedImmune

FluMist

7M

5%

Novartis

Fluvirin

46M

33%

Fluzone

50M

36%

Afluria

8.1M

6%

Fluarix

43.5M

32%

Kline

PasteurJ
2006-

120.9M

102.5M

2007

Vaccines
SanofiPasteurJ
2007-

140.6M

112.8 M

2008

Vaccines
SanofiPasteurJ
20082009

135.9M

113 M

CSL
GlaxoSmith
Kline

K

FluLaval

MedImmune

FluMist

6.8M

5%

Novartis

Fluvirin

27.2M

20%

Fluzone

50.3M

37%

Vaccines
SanofiPasteurJ
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A: Includes 9M contracted later in the season by the CDC, of which only 2M were ever
administered
B: Medeva was purchased by Celltech in January 2000 and in turn sold to Powderject shortly after
C: Faced cGMP violations and production was suspended. Parkedale had planned to distribute
12M doses
D: Powderject was purchased by Chiron in July 2003
E: 43M doses were already distributed as of October 31, 2002. There is no data available for entire
season.
F: Only 450,000 doses of the 5M were ever administered
G: 100M doses were originally planned before Chiron’s production was suspended
H: Only 50M planned, but Aventis pledged 8M additional doses to help alleviate shortage caused
by Chiron’s manufacturing problems
I: Production suspended by UK regulatory authorities. Chiron had planned to distribute 46M to
48M doses
J: Previously Aventis Pasteur
K: The license belongs to ID Biomedical Corp of Quebec, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
GlaxoSmithKline.
* Individual manufacturer production values may not add up to total production values due to
rounding
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Table 7 - Production Time for Egg-based vs. Cell-based Influenza Vaccine

Process

Egg-based

Cell culture based

Seed prep

2-8months

1-2months

Substrate availability

0-3months

0-0.5months

Facilities

Open system

Closed system

Timely availability

(-)

(+)

pandemic vaccine
Source: National Influenza Summit: May 2003 “Vaccine Production Using Cell Culture” Solvay
Pharmaceuticals
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Table 8 - Major WHO Approved Global Manufacturers of Inactivated Influenza Vaccine
Producer
Country
Brand name
Medimmune-Avirion
USA
FluMist
Austria Czech
Baxter-- Immuno AG
Republic
CSL
Australia
Fluvax
GSK
Belgium
FluarixNH Fluarix SH
Butantan (Filler)
Brazil
Gripe Vaccine
Mutagrip Vaxigrip
France
Tetagrip
Sanofi Pasteur
USA
Fluozone
Novartis
Germany
Fluad
Italy
Antigripal S1
UK
Fluvirin Evagrip
Denka Seiken Co, Ltd Japan
Influenza Seiken HA
Chemo-SeroInfluenza
Therapeutic Research Japan
Kaketsuken HA
Institute
Kitasato Institute
Japan
Influenza HA
Biken
Japan
Influenza Biken
Dong Shin
Dong Shin Influenza
Pharmaceuticals
Korea
HA
(Filler)
Korea Vaccine Co. Ltd
Korea
Influ-kovax
(Filler)
Korea Green Cross
Korea
Inflexal V
(Filler)
Solvay Healthcare
Netherlands
Influvac
VACCIN GRIPAL
TRIVALENT,
Cantacuzino Institute
Romania
PURIFICAT ªI
INACTIVAT
Immunopreparat
Research productive
Influenza Vaccine
association, Ufa
Products
Russia
Immunologicals and
Influenza Vaccine
Drugs. Irkustk
RIVS, Saint
Influenza Vaccine
Petersburg
Inflexal V, Vitagrip,
Berna -Crucell
Switzerland
Fluviral
ID Biomedical
Canada
FluInsure
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Wyeth Lederle
USA
Flushield
Torlak Institute
Serbia&Montenegro
Vaccinum Influenzae
Zhejiang Tianyuan China
BioPharmaceutical
Influenza
Co. Ltd
Sinovac Kexing
Biological Product Co.,
AnFlu TM
Ltd
Beijing Institute of
Biological Products
Influenza
(BIBP)
Shanghai Institute of
Biological Products
Influenza
(SIBP)
Changchun Institute of
Biological Products
Influenza
(CCIBP)
Changchun
Changsheng Life
Influenza
Sciences Ltd
Lanzhou Institute of
Biological Products
Influenza
(LIBP)
Shenzhen-Sanofi
Influenza
Pasteur (Filler)
Changzhou Yanshen
Biotechnology
Influenza
Co., Ltd
Liaoning Tiancheng
Bio-pharmacy Insitute
Influenza
Co. Ltd
Omninvest Ltd.
Hungary
Influenza
SOURCES: World Health Organization: “Influenza Vaccine Manufacturers”,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/Influenza_vaccine_manufacturers2009_05.pdf;
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Figure 1 – Entry and Exit of Vaccine Products (FDA-approved Licenses) 1901-2001
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Figure 2 - Predicted Number of Competitors as a Function of Years of Market Existence
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Note: Direct Competitors is the number of licensed vaccines of exactly the same
type in year t that are owned by other producers. All Competitors is the sum of
Direct Competitors plus other licensed vaccines that include the vaccine in
question in year t, including combination vaccines.
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1

This is true particularly for traditional pediatric vaccines against highly infectious diseases, such as polio, measles,
etc. In general, the cost-effectiveness of any specific vaccine depends on the price, the target population and the
measure of effectiveness. This analysis does not distinguish between pediatric and adult vaccines, because the
analysis applies to all types.
2
Institute of Medicine (2004); GAO (2002).
3
S. Jarrett, “Procurement Strategies for Drugs and Vaccines,” Wharton Impact Conference on Pharmaceutical
Innovation in a Global Economy (4-5 October 2002).
4
Mercer Management Consulting (2002), http://www.vaccinealliance.org/Support_to_Country/vpp/index.php. Basic
pediatric vaccines include measles, mumps, rubella, diptheria, TB, pertussis, polio, tetanus, typhoid etc. These older
vaccines are part of pediatric vaccination schedules in most countries, with financing for the poorest countries
through the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI).
5
USAToday 8/13/2010. http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2010-08-13-vaccines_N.htm (last
accessed 9/13/2010).
6
Government recommendation may increase coverage by private insurance as well as public programs.
7
States handle enrolment of eligible patients and eligible doctors, who receive free vaccine for these patients.
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/parents/default.htm#history. Last accessed 12/16/2010.
8
Jarrett, “Procurement Strategies for Drugs and Vaccines.”
9
Thimerosal is a mercury-containing preservative that was used in multi-dose vaccine vials that has been alleged to
be associated with autism.
10
R&D cost for vaccines is estimated to be comparable to other drugs (Grabowski, 2005). Vaccine production
requires unusually high investments in quality assurance, as a condition of getting and maintaining the plant license.
Fixed costs have been estimated at 60 percent of total production costs and semi-fixed batch costs at an additional
25percent (Mercer, 2002).
11
Combinations are usually produced by the producer(s) of the component parts.
12
If a vaccine produces adverse effects, many patients are likely to be affected. The risks associated with individual
vaccine doses are therefore correlated, not independent, as required for diversification and insurability.
13
The assumption that each firm sets its price and customers choose quantities characterizes the CDC procurement
process. It is also a plausible model of private purchasing in which buyers negotiate price discounts from competing
suppliers.
14
The pertussis component is usually not given to adults because whooping cough is less severe in older people
while the vaccine side effects may be more severe. Patients also receive diphtheria and tetanus boosters every ten
years. Nidus Information Services Inc., “What are the Vaccines for Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis?”
http://www.nym.org/healthinfo/docs/090/doc90diphtheria.html (15 November 2004).
15
Institute of Medicine (2004). In fact, the catalog price may overstate transactions prices paid by private customers due to
confidential discounting.
16
This argument implicitly assumes that producers underestimate the extent of government regulation prior to entry.
17
We also tested for effects of partial recommendation, but it was not significant.
18
Our absolute price is an imperfect proxy for the theoretically preferred mark-up of price over marginal cost, which
is not feasible because data on marginal cost are unavailable. Absolute price should be correlated with the pricemarginal cost mark-up if marginal cost is similar across vaccines in a given year, which is plausible for most of the
vaccines, However, given the potential measurement error in our price variable, conclusions on effects of CDC
price are tentative.
19
The correlation between Pre CDC and No CDC is only 0.3, because many vaccines were not purchased by CDC,
even after 1966.
20
Manning (1994) reports large price increases related to liability, especially for the pertussis vaccine. Offit (2005)
shows that the liability of vaccine manufacturers was established in the 1955 Cutter incident, in which patients were
infected with live polio vaccine, leading 70,000 to become ill, 200 became permanently paralyzed and 10 died. We
nevertheless use 1966 as the start date for strict liability because this formalized the law.
21
We also considered a measure of the number of vaccines licenses held by that manufacturer in t-1. This was
highly correlated with the Herfindahl, and was therefore dropped.
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22

For example, if there were two single diphtheria vaccines and one combination vaccine, DPT, which includes
diphtheria, each single diphtheria has one Direct Competitor and one Indirect Competitor.
23
The predicted median survival of these products is thirty years, with 25th and 75th percentiles at 17 and 49 years,
respectively, and a mean of 33.8 years. These predicted values are from a Kaplan-Meier survival estimator applied
to the censored observations.
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